Toplines<\/h2>\n
US President Donald Trump stated that US arms sales to Taiwan were under consideration and suggested that they could be used as a \u201cnegotiating chip\u201d with the PRC while cautioning Taiwan against seeking independence. The PRC could exploit these statements to gain leverage over the United States and decrease Taiwanese faith in the United States. <\/strong>Trump cautioned Taiwan against \u201cseeking independence\u201d and urged Taiwan to \u201ccool down\u201d tensions with the PRC during a May 15 interview.[1] Taiwanese President William Lai Ching-te has maintained that Taiwan does not need to declare formal independence because it already sees itself as a sovereign nation.[2] Taiwan\u2019s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) reiterated this idea on May 18 and emphasized that Taiwan seeks to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait.[3] The PRC consistently presents Lai and the ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) as \u201cindependence activists\u201d that \u201cprovoke\u201d PRC aggression.<\/p>\n Taiwanese Presidential Office Spokesperson Karen Kuo stated on May 16 that US law stipulates arms sales to Taiwan. Kuo\u2019s statement referred to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which governs the unofficial diplomatic relationship between Taiwan and the United States.[4] The TRA states that the United States \u201cshall make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capacity as determined by the President and the Congress.\u201d[5] The US\u2019s Taiwan policy is also based on an additional \u201cSix Assurances\u201d to Taiwan. One of these Assurances states that the United States has \u201cnot agreed to consult with the PRC on arms sales to Taiwan,\u201d placing Trump\u2019s comments in contradiction with the spirit of US policy.[6]\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Acting Secretary of the US Navy Hung Cao stated on May 21 that the United States paused a 14 billion US dollar weapons purchase to Taiwan to ensure sufficient munitions for US operations in the Middle East. <\/strong>Hung\u2019s statement follows reporting that the PRC could be delaying approval of talks with US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby.[7] US President Trump stated on May 20 that he would speak with Taiwanese President Lai, which may have influenced the PRC\u2019s actions.[8] No sitting US President has spoken directly with a Taiwanese President since 1979, in keeping with the US policy of \u201cstrategic ambiguity\u201d toward Taiwan.[9] The PRC cancelled an earlier set of talks with the United States discussing diplomatic exchanges with Colby over a Taiwan arms sale package announced in December 2025.[10] The PRC makes consistent statements opposing US arms sales to Taiwan and linking these arms sales to \u201cindependence\u201d and \u201cseparatist\u201d movements, despite Taiwan\u2019s stated policy of maintaining the status quo.[11] Official US statements regarding the pausing of arms sales to Taiwan do not mention the PRC. The PRC will likely seek to use this development to decrease Taiwanese faith in the United States and will likely seek to influence future US arms sales to Taiwan.<\/p>\n Note: A version of this text appeared in the May 20 Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment update.<\/a><\/em><\/p>\n CCP Secretary General Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin on May 20 but the two failed to reach an agreement on the Power of Siberia-2 pipeline. The PRC and Russia affirmed strong bilateral relations, but the two signed only comparatively minor bilateral agreements during Putin\u2019s official visit. <\/strong>PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) spokesperson Guo Jiakun during a May 19 press conference did not confirm whether the timing of the meeting \u2013 one week after Xi met with US President Donald Trump \u2013 held any significance.[12] Putin and Xi held a joint press conference on May 20 in which the leaders praised deep relations between Russia and the PRC and how Russia and the PRC actively cooperate in energy, noting that Russia is one of the PRC\u2019s largest oil suppliers.[13] Kremlin Presidential Aide Yuriy Ushakov stated that Russia and China reached agreements on energy projects and \u201csomething else very important,\u201d but did not specify what it was. The parties notably failed to reach an agreement on the construction of the Power of Siberia-2 (PS-2) pipeline.[14] The pipeline would deliver natural gas from Russia\u2019s Yamal Peninsula to the PRC, boosting Russian sales following Europe\u2019s attempts to divest from Russian gas.[15]<\/p>\n PRC rhetoric expressed positive views of the Russia-PRC partnership.[16] Putin and Xi signed a joint statement on further strengthening their comprehensive partnership and strategic interaction, and on deepening good-neighborly friendship and cooperation, about 40 intergovernmental, interagency, and corporate documents, mainly aimed at deepening economic cooperation, as well as a joint declaration on the Establishment of a Multipolar World and a New Type of International Relations.<\/em>[17]The PRC MFA announced that it is extending its visa-free policy for Russian passport holders traveling to the PRC through December 31, 2027.[18] The PRC has provided forms of support to Russia throughout its war in Ukraine. Reuters<\/em> reported that the PRC secretly trained approximately 200 Russian soldiers who deployed to Ukraine, citing European intelligence agencies and documents that Reuters obtained.[19] The PRC portrays itself as a neutral actor and mediator in Russia\u2019s war in Ukraine but actively benefits from the war\u2019s continuation. PRC Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in July 2025 that the PRC did not want Russia to lose the war.[20] Xi and Putin have met nine times since the outbreak of the war in 2022.[21]<\/p>\n The agreements signed during Xi and Putin\u2019s meeting were relatively minor in comparison to the Kremlin\u2019s hopes that Putin\u2019s visit would culminate in a signed deal on the PS-2, however, illustrating the PRC\u2019s pragmatic approach to relations with Russia. Russia and the PRC have been in disagreement about the PS-2 since at least 2024, as Russia faces a more immediate need for the pipeline to substitute for income from exports lost since Russia\u2019s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and the PRC is using its upper hand to extract concessions from Russia on the issue.[22] Ushakov highlighted on May 18 the PS-2 pipeline as one of the priority items for Putin\u2019s official visit to the PRC, and Putin\u2019s failure to secure a signed agreement demonstrates the current limits of PRC-Russia cooperation.[23]<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The World Health Organization (WHO) rejected Taiwan\u2019s participation in the World Health Assembly (WHA) for the tenth consecutive year.<\/strong>[24]<\/strong> The PRC routinely pushes to exclude Taiwan from international organizations to diplomatically isolate Taiwan and falsely represent Taiwan on the global stage. <\/strong>Spokespeople from the United States State Department and the European External Action Service expressed support for Taiwan\u2019s participation in the WHA.[25] PRC MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated that this rejection \u201cfully demonstrates that the international community\u2019s support for the one-China principle is unbreakable, and the authority of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 is beyond question.\u201d[26] The PRC MFA claimed that Taiwan had no right to participate in the WHA without PRC central government permission.[27] This statement is inaccurate, however, as the WHA does allow non-state entities to join as observers. Guo\u2019s statement is intended to suggest PRC control over Taiwan and deny Taiwanese sovereignty by denying its right to participate in international forums.<\/p>\n Taiwan was invited to the WHA as an observer under the name \u201cChinese Taipei\u201d from 2009 to 2016 under Ma Ying-jeou\u2019s presidency.[28] Ma was a member of the opposition Kuomintang (KMT), and a cornerstone of his administration\u2019s policy was developing closer ties with the PRC in accordance with the \u201c1992 consensus,\u201d under which Taiwan and the PRC agree that they belong to \u201cone China\u201d but with differing interpretations of what \u201cChina\u201d means.[29] The ruling Democratic Progressive Party\u2018s (DPP) platform is focused on removing PRC influence in Taiwan, and PRC statements regularly accuse the DPP of promoting \u201cseparatism\u201d and \u201cTaiwan independence.\u201d The DPP has ruled Taiwan since 2016 and the PRC has blocked DPP-ruled Taiwan\u2019s participation in the WHA to suppress Taiwan\u2019s international representation and punish Taiwanese support for the DPP.<\/p>\n The Taiwanese government is working to develop alternate methods to fund weapons procurement and domestic defense industrial development following the passage of a reduced Special Defense Budget.<\/strong> Taiwan passed the Special Defense Budget amounting to 780 billion New Taiwan Dollars (NTD) (approximately 25 million US dollars) on May 8 after significant negotiations between the ruling DPP and the opposition KMT and Taiwan People\u2019s Party (TPP).[30] The Lai administration initially proposed a 1.25 trillion NTD special defense budget. The final version of the Special Defense Budget notably omits funding for domestic or Taiwan-US joint arms development entirely. This will affect a plethora of critical defense procurements, such as drones, counter-drone systems, anti-ballistic missiles, and unmanned vehicles.[31] Moving drone procurements into Taiwan\u2019s regular budget delays funding until 2027 at minimum, and will delay Taiwan\u2019s indigenous drone industry\u2019s development and impede its asymmetric defense capacity.[32] Other defense systems affected by the Special Defense Budget cuts include the \u201cStrong Bow\u201d anti-ballistic missile essential to Taiwan\u2019s \u201cT-Dome\u201d integrated air-and-missile defense system.[33] An unnamed US defense official stated on the condition of anonymity that \u201cit was disappointing\u201d that \u201csome\u2026 stuff\u2026 that we believe still needs to be funded\u201d was cut from the budget.[34] The individual said they would \u201clike to see the rest of the original proposed package funded.\u201d[35]\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n Taiwanese Premier Cho Jung-tai stated that he is considering submitting another supplementary budget bill, increasing the general budget in 2027, or raising the Ministry of National Defense\u2019s (MND) annual budget to address gaps in the Special Defense Budget.[36] Taiwanese Defense Minister Wellington Koo voiced support for those options and stated that the MND is considering which method would be best for funding unmanned aerial vehicles.[37] The Taiwanese Cabinet has since passed a portion of the \u2018first wave\u2019 of already approved arms purchases funded through the Special Defense Budget, which appropriates 294 billion NTD to purchase US arms.[38] The LY is scheduled to expedite its review of the cabinet\u2019s proposed budget before the May 31 deadline to purchase US HIMARS.[39]\u00a0<\/p>\n The PRC allowed the first group of Shanghai tourists to visit Kinmen and Matsu as part of its efforts to frame increased cross-strait exchanges as an economic opportunity for Taiwan. <\/strong>PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times<\/em> reported on May 13 that Shanghai tourists had arrived in Kinmen, as part of the \u201cgradual recovery\u201d of cross-strait tourism.[40] The Shanghai Municipal Administration of Culture and Tourism announced on April 29 that Shanghai residents can visit Kinmen and Matsu on group or individual tours.[41] This announcement is in accordance with the PRC\u2019s ten policy measures to promote cross-strait relations announced on April 12, at the end of KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun\u2019s visit to the PRC.[42] The ten measures included a variety of economic measures to connect Taiwan and the PRC through trade, infrastructure, and tourism.<\/p>\n The PRC presents these expanded cross-strait economic ties as a \u201cwin-win situation\u201d for both sides of the Strait and will continue to criticize any efforts by the Taiwanese government to decrease cross-strait exchanges as \u201cunreasonable\u201d and a sign that the DPP is not acting in the best interests of the Taiwanese people.[43] Increased PRC-Taiwan economic ties present additional opportunities for PRC economic coercion targeting Taiwanese firms and industry. This carries additional risks for the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu given their geographic proximity to the PRC and existing economic ties with the PRC.<\/p>\n A United States Air Force (USAF) aircraft issued as many as nine messages reaffirming the right for aircraft to operate in international airspace in response to warnings sent from PLA aircraft to Taiwanese aircraft. <\/strong>A PLA Navy Air Force (PLANAF) aircraft initially issued three consecutive radio warnings in Chinese to a Taiwanese aircraft operating in Taiwan\u2019s Southwestern Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) on May 18. The PLANAF claimed the Taiwanese aircraft was endangering flight safety and demanded that the aircraft maintain a safe distance.[44] A nearby USAF aircraft replied to the warning multiple times in English, stating that all aircraft have the lawful right to operate in international airspace.[45] Similar confrontations between US and PRC aircraft have occurred in the Yellow Sea on February 18 and around Taiwan\u2019s Southwestern ADIZ on May 4, 2025.[46] The published radio exchange does not indicate whether the US aircraft\u2019s response was coordinated with the Taiwanese aircraft\u2019s reception of the initial PRC warnings.[47]<\/p>\n A consistent US aerial presence over the Taiwan Strait may act as a deterrent limiting PLA gray zone activities and may require Taiwan to expend fewer resources responding to PLA ADIZ incursions. Publicly available recordings of such confrontations may also increase Taiwanese trust in the United States as a reliable security partner in deterring PRC aerial harassment.<\/p>\n The PLA deployed the aircraft carrier Liaoning<\/em> and a carrier task group to the Western Pacific to conduct live-fire drills. <\/strong>A PLAN social media account said that the drills would involve training on long-range tactical flights, live firing, support and cover, and integrated search and rescue, to test and enhance realistic combat capabilities.[48] PRC state-owned tabloid Global Times<\/em> quoted \u201cmilitary affairs expert\u201d Zhang Junshe, who said that the Liaoning<\/em>\u2019s far-seas deployments have become routine and are meant to strengthen capabilities for both offshore defense and long-distance power projection.[49] The PRC would likely position aircraft carriers east of Taiwan to block US and allied intervention from the Pacific Ocean while it blockades or invades Taiwan.[50] Liaoning<\/em> previously drilled in the Western Pacific in December 2025.[51]\u00a0 Liaoning <\/em>became the first PRC aircraft carrier in June 2025 to sail east of Guam, a key US strategic base in the Pacific, while carrying out drills simultaneously with its fellow aircraft carrier Shandong. Liaoning <\/em>and Shandong <\/em>separately participated in two of the PLA\u2019s Joint Sword series blockade exercises around Taiwan in 2023 and 2024, respectively, and operated southeast of Taiwan, launching dozens of fighter jets and helicopters.[52]<\/p>\n Taiwan\u2019s MAC warned that the PRC is converting hundreds of old fighter jets into drones and deploying them to air bases near Taiwan. The PRC may use these drones to directly attack targets in Taiwan and elsewhere or as decoys to overwhelm Taiwan\u2019s air defenses. <\/strong>The MAC said that the PRC converted around 500 J-6 fighter jets into pilotless drones and already deployed at least 200 of them to six bases in Fujian and Guangdong, provinces bordering the Taiwan Strait.[53] The MAC cited data from the Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies, which used satellite imagery to identify the converted drones.[54] The J-6 fighter jet is an old model based on 1950s-era Soviet jets. The PLA has converted J-6s into drones, called J-6Ws, since at least 2013, but first publicly displayed such a drone at the Changchun Air Show in September 2025.[55] Mitchell Institute senior fellow J. Michael Dahm assessed that the J-6W drones would likely be used to directly fly into targets, similar to cruise missiles.[56] The drones can attack in large numbers to overwhelm air defenses, forcing Taiwan and other targeted countries to expend munitions shooting them down even if they do not carry a payload.<\/p>\n The PRC\u2019s fleet of J-6W and other drone capabilities illustrate the importance of Taiwan developing its own domestic drone program and integrated air defense system. Taiwan\u2019s legislature recently passed a 25 million US Dollar special defense budget that funded procurements from the United States but excluded funding for domestically-produced defenses.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n Japan is continuing to engage in coalition-building and defense innovation efforts alongside the United States and regional partner nations. These efforts, which the PRC criticizes in an ongoing pressure campaign, supplement legislation aimed at increasing Japan\u2019s defense budget.<\/strong> Japan\u2019s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) submitted a proposal requesting that the Japanese government raise defense spending to 5 percent of its GDP.[57] LDP draft proposals requested the early deployment of high-energy weapons and interceptor drones, reflecting the LDP\u2019s efforts to bolster defense.[58] The Japanese government may also place early warning radar on Iwo Jima, the Ogasawara Islands, and Chichijima, a move that could strengthen Japanese threat detection.[59] These proposed reforms reflect Japan\u2019s efforts to revise its three key security documents, a cornerstone of Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi\u2019s defense leadership. These documents include the National Security Strategy, the Defense Buildup Program, and the National Defense Strategy.[60]<\/p>\n Japan has similarly taken steps to boost defense research and innovation. Japan requested to participate in the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), a NATO program that supports defense startup companies. NATO Assistant Secretary General for defense industry, innovation and armaments Tarja Jaakkola confirmed this news on May 15 and expressed that the participation of Japan \u2013 a NATO non-member state \u2013 could prove mutually beneficial for both Japan and NATO.[61] Japan\u2019s outreach to NATO comes as the Japanese government attempts to reform the funding process for Japanese defense startups. The Japan Growth Strategy Council\u2019s subcommittee on startups is putting together a proposal to allocate funding to defense tech firms, including possible advanced funding for startups.[62]<\/p>\n Japan\u2019s domestic defense reforms accompany its growing coalition-building efforts with regional partners. Japan plans to deepen information-sharing efforts regarding maritime domain awareness (MDA) with Southeast Asian nations to protect sea lanes critical to trade. Japan plans to do this via private-public partnerships encompassing approximately eight countries by the 2030s.[63] Japan is also making efforts to strengthen its ties with South Korea. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi met with South Korean President Lee Jae Myung on May 19 and affirmed cooperative efforts, including security cooperation involving the United States.[64] Japan\u2019s strengthening ties with South Korea accompany similar efforts in the Philippines, where Japan signed a reciprocal access agreement.[65] Japan participated in the Philippines\u2019 Balikatan annual defense exercises alongside US forces in spring 2026.[66] The Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces similarly engaged in exercises with US troops shortly after Balikatan, establishing a joint coordination center on Miyako Island for the first time.[67]<\/p>\n The PRC has responded to Japan\u2019s remilitarization and coalition-building efforts with a sustained economic and rhetorical pressure campaign. The PRC blames Takaichi for Japan-PRC tensions and demands that Takaichi retract her 2025 comments that a Taiwan contingency could implicate Japan. PRC MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun reiterated this rhetoric during a May 18 press conference, stating that Japanese \u201cright-wing forces\u201d are disrupting regional peace.[68]<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The PRC may be docking boats in Manila to confuse Philippine threat awareness by broadcasting fake ship signals, including one of a China Coast Guard (CCG) vessel. ISW-CDOT previously observed very similar PRC signal spoofing used against Taiwan. <\/strong>Ship-tracking data from Starboard Maritime Intelligence shows that the Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals of at least 13 PRC vessels appeared in Manila harbor since April 28 that appeared to \u201cteleport\u201d between Manila and various locations along the PRC coast. This pattern of movement indicates AIS spoofing, possibly involving boats in multiple locations transmitting the same fake ship identities. Many of the same signals previously appeared in and around the harbor of Tamsui Fisherman\u2019s Wharf, a dock in New Taipei City, Taiwan throughout the last three years.[69] One of the signals is labeled as \u201cChina Coast Guard 18602,\u201d one is labeled as a tugboat, and several are labeled as fishing boats. Starboard data shows that spoofed PRC signals have appeared periodically in Manila and other Philippine ports in recent years, but this is the first time Manila has been a \u201chub\u201d for multiple such signals since December 2024. Philippine authorities reported in December 2024 that one or more PRC dredging vessels working in the Manila harbor were broadcasting fake signals, including the AIS of a CCG ship. [70]<\/p>\n The PRC has used AIS spoofing as a form of cognitive warfare against Taiwan by causing Taiwan\u2019s ship detection technology to detect fake vessels or become overwhelmed with fake data.[71] The PRC can use AIS spoofing to inflate the apparent number of PRC boats in Taiwan-administered waters, disguise the true location of PRC vessels conducting malign activities, intimidate or overwhelm Taiwanese decision-makers, and waste Taiwan\u2019s resources.[72] ISW-CDOT has observed relatively few instances of this tactic used against the Philippines compared to Taiwan, however, despite high China Maritime Militia (CMM) activity around disputed islands in the South China Sea.[73] Reuters<\/em> reported that the PRC experimented with aerial drones in the South China Sea to broadcast fake aircraft signals since August 2025.[74]<\/p>\n The fake AIS broadcasts from Manila and New Taipei City likely indicate that the PRC has docked at least one boat in those locations that is periodically transmitting the false signals. The PRC\u2019s ability to dock vessels in Philippine and Taiwanese ports to carry out cognitive warfare operations undetected suggests that the PRC could similarly smuggle dual-use or military equipment undetected. Ukraine\u2019s Operation Spiderweb in June 2025, in which Ukraine used seemingly ordinary trucks to launch drone attacks deep inside Russia, shows how countries, including the PRC, could launch a surprise attack from inside the target country\u2019s territory by using drones smuggled on ostensibly commercial trucks or ships.[75] The PRC has experimented with converting a cargo ship into an \u201carsenal ship\u201d full of drones and missiles hidden in boxes aboard shipping containers.[76]<\/p>\n Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. stated during a May 18 interview with Japanese media that the Philippines would likely be involved in a Taiwan conflict. Marcos later walked this statement back, possibly due to PRC pressure. <\/strong>Marcos stated that the Philippines would have less of a choice to get involved in a Taiwan scenario than Japan. [77] Marcos stated that such a contingency would involve the Philippines due to its geographic proximity and 200,000 Filipino nationals in Taiwan.<\/p>\n PRC MFA spokesperson Guo Jiakun replied by restating Marcos\u2019 past affirmation of the one-China policy, which states that there is only one China in the world, and stated that Marcos\u2019 reasoning was insufficient for interfering in another country\u2019s \u201cinternal affairs\u201d at the May 19 press conference.[78] Marcos later clarified his remarks on May 19, stating that the Philippines will not intervene in the Taiwan issue.[79]<\/p>\n<\/div>\n The Solomon Islands\u2019 new PRC-skeptical prime minister may seek closer ties with the West but is unlikely to disrupt the PRC\u2019s deep economic and security involvement in the Solomon Islands. The Solomon Islands has been one of the PRC\u2019s closest partners in the South Pacific since it cut ties with Taiwan in 2019. <\/strong>The Solomon Islands legislature removed Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele in a no-confidence vote on May 7.[80] It then elected opposition figure Matthew Wale as Prime Minister on May 15.[81]<\/p>\n Manele was the country\u2019s foreign minister under the previous Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare when the Solomon Islands severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 2019 and signed a controversial security agreement with the PRC in 2022.[82] Manele replaced Sogavare as Prime Minister in 2024 and continued pursuing relatively pro-PRC policies.[83] The Solomon Islands unsuccessfully pushed to strip Taiwan of its \u201cdevelopment partner\u201d status in the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) in 2024, reportedly under PRC pressure.[84] The Solomon Islands hosted the PIF in 2025 and excluded Taiwan, the PRC, and the United States from participating entirely, possibly to exclude Taiwan specifically or avoid a geopolitical confrontation.[85] Newly elected prime minister Wale vocally opposed the Solomon Islands\u2019 2022 security agreement with the PRC at the time, saying that most Solomon Islanders \u201cdo not want China here at all.\u201d[86] A leaked draft of the agreement included language requesting PRC aid in policing the Solomon Islands and granting the PRC access and replenishment rights to Solomon Islands ports, as well as the right to use its armed forces to protect PRC projects and personnel in the Solomon Islands.[87]<\/p>\n Wale may seek to balance the PRC by pursuing stronger ties with Australia and the United States, but he is unlikely to restore his country\u2019s diplomatic relations with Taiwan or significantly curtail PRC influence. Wale notably softened his rhetoric on the PRC in recent years.[88] Wale told the PRC ambassador that he would continue to adhere to the One China Principle and deepen PRC-Solomons cooperation, according to PRC state media.[89] The PRC has entrenched itself in the Solomon Islands through a variety of cooperation programs and investments that may be difficult to undo, however. The PRC has invested hundreds of millions of dollars in infrastructure construction in the Solomon Islands since 2019, signed media partnerships to promulgate PRC-friendly views, and expanded police training partnerships.[90]<\/p>\n<\/div>\nKey Takeaways<\/h2>\n
\n
Cross-Strait Relations<\/h2>\n
Taiwan<\/h3>\n
China<\/h3>\n
\n![\"Map](\"https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/PLA-Events-Around-Taiwan-Week-of-May-18-2026.webp\")
<\/a><\/div>\nNortheast Asia<\/h2>\n
Japan<\/h3>\n
Southeast Asia<\/h2>\n
Philippines<\/h3>\n
![\"Map](\"https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/05\/Likely-PRC-Signal-Spoofing-in-the-Philippines-May-2026.webp\")
<\/a><\/div>\nOceania<\/h2>\n
![\"Powered](\"https:\/\/understandingwar.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/02\/Babel_Street_endnotes_2026.webp\")
<\/figure>\n